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Abstract—By growing the number of Internet users and the
prevalence of web applications, we have to deal with very complex
software and applications in the network. This results in an
increasing number of new vulnerabilities in the systems, which
consequently leads to an increase in the cyber and, in particular,
zero-day attacks. The cost of generating appropriate signatures
for these attacks is a potential motive for using machine learning-
based methodologies. Although there exist many studies on the
use of learning-based methods for attack detection, they generally
use extracted features and overlook raw contents. This approach
can lessen the performance of detection systems against content-
based attacks like SQL injection, Cross-site Scripting (XSS), and
various viruses.
As a new paradigm, in this work, we propose a scheme, called
deep intrusion detection (DID) system that uses the pure content
of traffic flows in addition to traffic metadata in the learning and
detection phases. To this end, we employ deep learning techniques
recently developed in the machine learning community. Due to the
inherent nature of deep learning, it can process high dimensional
data content and, accordingly, discover the sophisticated relations
between the auto extracted features of the traffic. To evaluate
the proposed DID system, we use the ISCX IDS 2017 dataset.
The evaluation metrics, such as precision and recall, reach 0.992
and 0.998, respectively, which show the high performance of the
proposed DID method.
Index Terms—Deep Learning, Intrusion Detection, Content-
Based Attacks, Recurrent Neural Networks, Long Short-Term
Memory, Machine Learning, Misuse, Malware Detection, DoS
Attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
WE live in the cyber era in which network-based tech-nologies have become omnipresent. Meanwhile, threats
and attacks are rapidly growing in the cyberspace. Nowadays,
mainly signature-based intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are
used to detect these malicious traffics. However, since new
vulnerabilities and, consequently, zero-day attacks appear each
day, the cost of generating accurate signatures with a low false-
positive rate is growing.
The traditional approach to intrusion detection systems is
based on detecting some form of a signature. A signature
is extracted from the known attacks by employing security
experts. A signature must completely cover different variants
of the attack for which it has been extracted. Also, benign
traffic and other types of attacks should not be falsely confused
with it. Hence, extracting an accurate signature is a compli-
cated and time-consuming process. By the increasing growth
of the Internet’s applications and users, more vulnerabilities
are expected to appear, which results in emerging more new
attacks. Therefore, the signature extraction process becomes a
more challenging problem in the coming years.
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The learning-based approach is an alternative solution to
the signature-based intrusion detection systems. In addition
to resolving the signature extraction problem, some learning
approaches can also detect zero-day attacks by determining
abnormal traffic.
There exist several research studies on the use of ma-
chine learning methods for the detection of intrusions in
computer networks. Among them, we can mention pioneers
like Bayesian networks [1], support vector machine (SVM)
[2], decision trees [3], and the new deep learning techniques
(e.g., see [4] and [5]). These studies generally focus on some
specific features of traffic as inputs, and they usually have a
low potential to detect content-based attacks. However, it is
well known that the content-based attacks, like SQL injection,
malicious software, and viruses, are the most destructive
attacks against assets that are accessible on the Internet.
According to our study, only a few of previous learning-
based works on IDSs have considered content-based attacks.
These works, like [6], [7], [8], and [9], use n-gram methods
for extracting the frequencies of characters in deterministic
windows. However, as shown in [10], n-gram methods are
vulnerable to mimicry attacks. In these kinds of attacks, some
unused parts of packets like IP options or PADDING parts in
exploits can be used for adjusting the frequencies of n-grams.
A severe obstacle for analyzing the contents of network
traffic is the large dimension of payloads. Nowadays, this chal-
lenge can be handled effectively by employing Deep Learning
techniques [11], [12]. In this paper, a deep learning-based
intrusion detection method, called deep intrusion detection
(DID) system is proposed. It uses the pure content of traffic
(i.e., packet payload) as the input data. In the pre-processing
phase, the content of each flow is converted to a numerical
matrix. The learning and detection phases use this matrix for
separating normal traffic from the malicious one.
In this work, our primary contribution is to use all content
bytes of traffic during the learning and detection phases. This
goal is achieved by employing deep learning methods (in
particular, in this work, we leverage using the LSTM neural
network). Besides, we propose an appropriate pre-processing
phase for feeding the traffic flows into the learning models.
Finally, we evaluate our proposed scheme on the ISCX IDS
2017 dataset [13]. This dataset has an appropriate variety
of full captured normal and attacks traffic; in particular, it
contains some content-based attacks like Heartbleed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we summarize the most relevant related works.
Section III presents the details of the proposed DID system.
This system also includes a pre-processing phase for preparing
contents of traffic flows to be fed to a deep learning model
(i.e., an LSTM neural network). In Section IV, the conducted
experiments and results obtained are discussed. Finally, Sec-
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2tion V concludes the paper and explains the possible future
directions.
II. RELATED WORKS
In the following, we will review some of the learning-based
approaches used in intrusion detection systems.
A. Traditional Machine Learning Approach
In the literature, a variety of learning-based techniques such
as support vector machine (SVM), naive Bayes, decision tree,
random forest, and neural networks have been proposed for
intrusion detection systems.
SVM is one of the most popular classification algorithms
used so far. It has been used in research studies like [2], [14],
[15] and [16]. In this algorithm, the classification process is
performed by detecting a set of hyperplanes, as separators,
in a high-dimensional space. The high time-complexity of the
learning phase and the difficulty of finding a suitable kernel
function are the most important challenges of this method.
Learning time complexity has a superlinear relation with the
number of input instances. Besides, there is a quadratic relation
between the size of the kernel matrix and the number of
instances.
Bayesian classifiers [17] use Bayes rule for predicting
membership of input data to classes. They are built by
using expert knowledge or efficient algorithms that perform
inference. In Naive Bayesian classifiers, features are assumed
to be conditionally independent. Though this assumption is
not satisfied in practice, however, experiments have proved its
good performance. Many papers have used this technique, e.g.,
see [18] and [1].
Authors in [18] have suggested generating multi-Bayesian
network models in which each one separately generates an
anomaly score for the input traffic. In [1], an IDS based
on Bayesian network classifiers is proposed. In this research,
association rules are used for the detection of normal/intrusion
traffic. New traffic will get a low probability level for each of
the normal or attack groups. So, these suspicious connections
will also be labeled as an attack. In the second phase, these
attacks are classified into four known or unknown attack
categories by Bayesian rules.
One of the main data mining techniques used in intrusion
detection systems is associated with decision trees. In [19], the
misuse detection engine of Snort [20] is replaced by decision
trees. Firstly, the existing rules are provided to a clustering
algorithm for reducing the comparison needed to determine
rules that are triggered by specific input data. These clusters
are based on the values of important features. When the
clustering algorithm reaches a rule set for the given feature
of the input data, the decision tree determines the triggered
rules inside that cluster.
Random forests (RF) [21] consist of a collection of decision
trees. In addition to good performance in comparison with
SVM and neural networks (NNs), this approach can run
efficiently on large datasets with many features. RF is robust
against overfitting and can handle unbalanced data. Works like
[3] and [22] use this technique.
Artificial neural networks (ANNs) had been the most popu-
lar algorithms until the 1990s when SVM was invented. Of the
benefits of SVM against ANN, one can mention to its having
a less local minimum problem and also its lower learning
time. However, with the emergence of new ANN variants like
recurrent and convolutional NNs, the ANNs have begun to be
used again.
In [23], a detector for finding attacks on Telnet is proposed.
This system extracts 89 pre-defined keywords from the Telnet
sessions. These keywords represent the suspicious actions or
well-known attacks in Telnet. After extracting the distribution
of these keywords, their statistics are given to a binary neural
network. Finally, the instances which are recognized as attacks,
are given to a secondary NN, which determines the class name
of the attack. They have finally obtained detection rates up to
80%.
ANNs can also be used for the detection of DoS attacks
like SYNFLOOD, UDPSTORM, and SMURF (for example,
see [24]). For this purpose, authors of [24] use a time window,
which is then labeled as normal or attack traffic. Since the
input size of an ANN is fixed, they use a pre-processing
phase with the aid of an anomaly-based ANN, namely, a self-
organization map (SOM). SOM can cluster the input data into
a fixed number of clusters. Hence, independently from the
number of packets in the time window, a fixed number of
inputs is provided for the ANN by this clustering technique.
The model is evaluated by DARPA 1999 dataset [25] and
reaches 100% detection of normal traffic and 76% false-
positive rate for attacks.
In 2017, feature reduction techniques had been proposed
by using ANNs [26]. The authors use a combination of
information gain and correlation for feature selection. Then,
after normalizing the numbers of each class in the KDD99
dataset [27], their model achieves the average recall value of
91.72%.
B. Deep Learning Approach
Recurrent neural network (RNN) is a class of ANNs in
which nodes have some amount of memory. As a result, in
addition to the current input, the previous inputs can also
influence the current output. These networks are suitable for
sequential inputs that possess a dependency with each other.
Long short-term memory (LSTM) network is a class of RNNs
[28]. LSTM has been proposed to solve the vanishing and
exploding gradient by introducing some gates to the neural
network structure. Therefore, LSTM can effectively learn the
relations between items that are far away from each other in
a sequence. Computer network flows, consisting of packets,
form a sequence of data; hence, RNN and LSTM are natural
candidates for the analysis of computer network traffics.
Authors in [4] have employed gated recurrent unit (GRU),
which is a variant of LSTM. They have slightly modified GRU
and used SVM as a classifier instead of the softmax function.
The goal of this modification is to increase the computational
efficiency of the model. They have evaluated the proposed
model with 2013 network traffic data obtained by the honeypot
systems at Kyoto University. The inputs of this model are 24
3statistical features of the dataset. For improving performance
and reducing the computation cost of the mode, the continuous
features are converted to bins and, finally, are represented in
a one-hot format. Their model has an average accuracy of
80.53%.
In another work, Kim et al. [29] have applied LSTM archi-
tecture in IDS and use the KDD99 dataset for evaluating their
proposed model. Their input vector contains 41 normalized
features, and the output vector is composed of 4 attack classes
and one non-attack class. In their evaluation, the average
values of recall and fall-out are 98.79% and 10%, respectively.
In [30], the authors use deep learning for detecting anoma-
lies in a software-defined network (SDN) environment. They
use six basic features of the NSL-KDD dataset (duration,
protocol type, SRC bytes, DST bytes, count, and SRV count)
to detect anomaly flows. Finally, the attack detection accuracy
is reported as 75.75%.
Also, in some other research studies like [31], [32], and [33],
the deep learning approach is employed for the reduction of
input dimensions by selecting among pre-extracted features.
Although deep learning methods have been proposed for
solving intrusion detection problems so far, to the best of
our knowledge, they use extracted features of inputs, as in
traditional approaches. These features mostly represent general
aspects of traffic flow, like source/destination port/IP address,
duration time, start time, and packet/byte number of sent or
received packets. These features are generally crucial to the
detection of some kinds of attacks like DDoS and portscan.
However, many important attacks, like SQL injections, worms,
viruses, and XSS, which are content-based attacks, have gen-
eral features very similar to benign traffics. In the following,
some traditional research studies which have paid attention to
these kinds of attacks are reviewed.
C. Content-Based Approach
Generally, some restricting extracted features are used in
machine learning-based intrusion detectors. These general
features are rarely based on contents transmitted through the
established flow. Consequently, content-based attacks have a
high impact on the security and privacy of network applica-
tions and services in such systems.
In the following, we review some related works on content
inspection for intrusion detection. Most of the payload-based
detectors extract statistical features by using the n-gram tech-
nique. PYLE [6], Anagram [7], and McPAD [8] are among
the most well-known works. PYLE uses 1-gram method and
extracts the frequency of values in each byte of the packet.
Anagram uses 5-gram and stores the extracted 5-grams in
Bloom filters. There are two kinds of Bloom filters in this
work: one designed for attacks and the other for benign n-
grams. Finally, these two Bloom filters examine the input
traffic.
It is evident that in n-gram analysis, the dimension of
feature space grows dramatically. Hence, limited by the curse
of dimensionality problem, in practice, this approach can be
used at most for n = 2, which yields 65536 features. To
mitigate this problem, McPAD [8] measures the frequency
of the occurrences of pairs of symbols (bytes), which are k
bytes apart from each other in the payload. In this way, some
information in n-grams with n > 2 can be extracted by such
pairs of bytes. Moreover, this method will only generate 2562
features regardless of the value of k.
In [10], the authors show that blending attacks can defeat
n-gram methods. These attacks fill unused parts of network
traffics with new characters in proportion to the target fre-
quency and, consequently, convert the statistics of characters
to become similar to benign traffics. Their evaluation shows
that to launch an attack against a 5-gram detector, at least
two packets (i.e., about 2000 bytes) are needed. Besides, they
propose fragmentation overlapping for solving larger values of
n. Different operation systems (OSs) have different behaviors
for extracting bytes in overlapping situations. They may prefer
the first or last arrived overlapped bytes. The other bytes will
be ignored by the OS. So these ignored bytes can be used in
higher values of n for deluding the n-gram detectors.
In another research [34], after encoding the content by
Base64, the integer values are extracted. Finally, the frequen-
cies of these integer values are enumerated. Even though
authors do not mention an n-grams method, but in fact, they
have used a 1-gram approach.
III. METHODOLOGY
The high dimensionality of traffic content is one of the
biggest challenges in the detection of content-based attacks.
Although this challenge can be addressed by employing deep
learning methodology, according to our survey, all the previous
proposed studies have focused on pre-extracted features which
are vulnerable to content-based attacks.
In this work, we propose a deep learning-based IDS method
to extend the detection scope by covering the content-based
attacks as well. Since traffic contents can have long-time de-
pendencies, input feature space should have a high dimension.
As deep learning methods are designed for such large data
spaces, we propose using deep learning techniques directly
on the raw bytes of contents instead of applying it to the
extracted traffic features. The proposed method is called deep
intrusion detection (DID). This method can be applied to both
passive and on-line traffic. In this research, the passive mode
is followed, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Pcap File Flow Splitter
Reached Normaized 
Matrix per Flow Deep Learning Model
Labeled
Flows
Fig. 1. General illustration of DID system in the passive mode.
Since traffic flows consist of sequences of data, algorithms
like RNN and LSTM that are developed for sequential data
are among the best candidates for the DID approach. In the
following, we describe the proposed DID approach and explain
how it uses deep learning methods to detect content-based
4attacks. In the following, we have two main subsections. The
first one provides a complete description of the pre-processing
module, and the second highlights the deep learning module
of DID. In particular, in this work, we will employ LSTM
for the deep learning module of DID. However, it should be
noted that DID is not only limited to use LSTM, rather other
algorithms can also be employed in the deep learning module.
A. Pre-processing Phase in Deep Intrusion Detection
Traditional learning methods highly depend on the pre-
extracted features. As a result, the accuracy of such algorithms
depends heavily on the selection of input features. Hence,
these features should be found and extracted by experts, which
makes the process expensive, time-consuming, and prone to
error. Moreover, due to the increase of variant of known
attacks and the emergence of new ones, extracting some static
and definite features cannot provide adequate information for
intrusion detection tasks.
In contrast, deep learning algorithms can extract compli-
cated features from the raw data automatically. Consequently,
to address the above issues, DID uses deep learning techniques
to learn various cyberattacks, including content-based attacks.
It is well known that deep learning algorithms can detect
sophisticated relations in high dimensional spaces. Hence, they
are good candidates for the detection of content-based attacks.
Although some content-based intrusion detection systems
like [6], [7], and [8] focus on packet-level granularity, in real-
world, some packets can belong to both benign and attack
flows (e.g., SYN or FIN packets, or HTTP GET requests in
DDoS attacks). Moreover, some attacks are distributed among
more than one packet. Therefore, the concept of malicious
traffic resides in the flow contents. As a result, we assume
that the input to the DID method is based on flows instead of
packets.
In this work, we propose an offline version of DID, where
each flow is considered as an input sequence to an LSTM
neural network. Each packet represents a data point in the
input sequence. Since the maximum Ethernet frame size is
around 1500 bytes, so we consider 1500 as the dimension for
each packet. Hence, the input is assumed to be a sequence of
1500-dimensional points.
Additionally, the size of input sequences depends on the
number of packets in the traffic flows. In the offline DID,
we assume some reasonable maximum value for the number
of packets (which we will later determine this parameter by
inspecting the dataset). Finally, since each byte is in the range
of 0 to 255, in order to improve the deep network performance
and making the parameters on the same scale, we normalize
each byte value to a number between 0 and 1, by dividing it
to 255.
According to the pre-processing phase explained above,
we have a normalized matrix per each flow (as depicted
in Figure 2), where rows describe different packets in the
flow, and the ith column contains the normalized value of
the ith bytes of packets. Moreover, we add a column to the
matrix for storing inter-arrival times of packet flows to detect
attacks such as HTTP flooding, which sends some benign
requests continuously over the established connection. These
normalized matrices can be the input of the deep learning
module of DID (we will later enrich these matrices).
3rd byte
packet s 
time
interval
1st byte 2nd byte
2nd
packet
1st
packet
3rd
packet
...
kth
packet
...
nth byte
Fig. 2. Basic output of the pre-processing phase in the form of a normalized
matrix, that is fed into the deep learning module.
Considering a large number of parameters in deep learning
algorithms, and a limited number of flows that are used in the
training phase, there is a reasonable chance of overfitting if
the datasets are not used with enough care. As an example, IP
addresses can be a misleading factor. This misleading effect
exists in most of the available public datasets like ISCX IDS
2017 [13] and KDD99 [27]. In [35], authors have shown that
many parameters of the DARPA 99 [25] traffic, like TTL, TOS,
and the IP addresses, can cause overfitting. For example, TTLs
of the attack traffics are mostly 126 and 253, but benign traffic
has nine restricted values, which are different from the attack
ones. Besides, source IP addresses of attacks are different from
benign traffics and can simply be used for discrimination. The
KDD99 dataset also has inherited these vulnerabilities. Since
the attack traffic constitutes a small part of the dataset, there
are so many IP addresses that are purely normal, and the
algorithm can assign a substantial weight for IP addresses to
attain higher accuracy. However, we know that this is not a
valid assumption in the real-world.
Considering the above issues, in our pre-processing phase,
we eliminate some bytes of packets that belong to fields
like CHECKSUM and IP addresses. It should be noted that
this elimination can cause some performance reduction in
the detection phase. For example, ignoring the client’s IP
address in a monolithic environment, like a university, can
avoid overfitting, but in heterogeneous networks with different
types of clients, some valuable information can be missed.
Besides, server IP addresses can be beneficial in server-side
IDSes. So, in the real world, this elimination should be applied
according to the conditions of the deployment environment.
The pre-processing phase can be completed by enriching
the normalized matrices. The basic pre-processing matrices are
adequate for detecting flow-based attacks. However, there exist
other kinds of attacks that can be recognized by considering
some intra-flows features. These features are also added to the
first row of the basic pre-processing matrix to make it richer.
For example, flooding attacks can be generated by making
many legitimate connections rapidly, and these kinds of attacks
can be detected by adding time intervals between flows. Since
in the real world, the normal and attack flows are interleaved,
the computation of the time interval between flows should be
5based on the original flows’ arrival times. The other approach
is based on splitting the flows into benign traffic and attack,
and then extracting the time interval in each subgroup. This
approach can increase the detection error ratio when there
exists normal traffic between attacks.
To address the intra-flow attacks, we use four more ex-
tensive intra-flows features as follows: aggregative source or
destination address repetition in a fixed-size bucket of packets
or in a time window. Attacks like DDoS use multi different
IP addresses to send requests to the victim server, called Type
I attacks. Detection of this kind of attack can be done by
aggregating flows that have the same destination IP address.
On the other hand, in some attacks like port scanning, there
is a single client IP address that tries to recognize different
active services (ports) on a specific victim IP address or
a specific service (port), which is activated on a network
range. The mentioned scenarios have the same source address
and destination port or same source and destination address,
respectively. For simplification, we call these kinds of attacks
as Type II.
Another important aspect of detecting intra-flow attacks
is network bandwidth. For networks with low bandwidth, a
fixed size window (or bucket) is used for aggregation. As the
time interval between flows can exceed the time threshold,
time windows cannot detect the attacks. On the other hand,
the fixed-size window cannot detect attacks in high-speed
traffics because the window will be filled rapidly, and the
new information will overwrite the older ones. A time window
can handle this situation as well. In real networks, bandwidth
has no fixed value, and according to the conditions like days
vs. nights, it can have low or high bandwidth. So we use a
combination of these two kinds of windows for the detection
of intra-flow attacks.
The four aforementioned intra-flow features are extracted
per each flow. Detection of Type I attacks depends on the
aggregation of flows based on their destination IP addresses.
Hence, as a new flow arrives, it is compared with flows that
are observed in the fixed-size and fixed-time windows. The
number of flows having the same IP address as the new one
in both windows is used as features. Similarly, aggregation
based on the source IP address is done for the detection of
Type II attacks. In this case, the source address of each flow
is compared with the source addresses of flows in the fixed-
size and fixed-time windows.
Finally, the five new intra-flow features will be added to the
first row of the basic normalized matrix (see Figure 3). This
enriched matrix will be used as an input of the deep learning
module of DID. In the following, some candidates for DID
deep learning module are discussed, and the LSTM model is
implemented.
B. Deep Learning Module of Deep Intrusion Detection
As mentioned earlier, in DID, we prepare a rich normalized
matrix as the input for a deep learning algorithm. This matrix
has the potential for extracting content-based and some intra-
flow attacks. In the following, some candidates for deep learn-
ing modules are discussed. The main important point, which
…
Packet’s 
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… …
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dst in time 
window
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window
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bytenth4th byte
Fig. 3. The format of enriched normalized matrices that are used as the input
to the deep learning module of DID.
is common among the proposed methods, is the sequential
nature of these algorithms. In fact, since packets, flows, and
network traffics are all, in general, sequential data, the chosen
algorithms should match or benefit from this feature.
1) Recurrent Neural Networks: Recurrent Neural Network
(RNN) is suitable for learning patterns in data sequences and
time series, such as processing natural languages and genetic
data [36]. This feature makes RNN an extremely useful tool for
analyzing computer network traffic. The difference between
recurrent neural networks and feed-forward neural networks is
that besides the current input, some information from previous
inputs is also processed. In RNN, decision making related to
an input instant at the moment t depends on the decision made
at the moment t − 1.
The mathematical definition of the forward memory transfer
process in recursive neural networks is as follows
ht = φ(Wxt +Uht−1),
where ht is the state of the hidden layer of the recurring neural
network at the moment t. The value of ht is a function of
the input at the moment t (i.e., xt ) which is multiplied to
hidden layer weights W, and the last moment hidden layer
feedback ht−1 which is multiplied to its own weights U. The
weight matrices apply the relative importance of the input at
the current moment and the feedback input from the previous
moment.
2) LSTM: LSTM is a special type of recurring neural
network which is capable of learning long-term dependencies.
These networks have proven to be very effective in many
different circumstances and are now widely used in practice.
An LSTM layer consists of some similar units, called LSTM
cell. Inside each cell, there are four neural networks linked to
each other in a specific structure (see Figure 4). One of the
main concepts in an LSTM cell is its state, denoted by Ct . The
cell state passes forward in the entire recurring neural network
chain, and only a few linear operators are applied to it. The
LSTM network is capable of clearing or adding information to
the cell state by using the gateways. The current input xt of the
neural network is concatenated with the feedback input ht−1,
and this joint vector enters into four distinct neural networks.
If the current input and the feedback input of the LSTM cell
have equal sizes (e.g., n), then the input to each of those four
neural networks is equal to 2n, and each of them has n neurons
and produces n outputs.
The activation functions of the four neural networks are not
the same; three neural networks have the “sigmoid” activation
6tx
1-th
+X
σ 
tf
σ tanh
X
σ 
ti tg to
1-tC tC
th
th
tanh
X
Fig. 4. The internal structure of an LSTM cell.
function, and the other one uses “tanh”. The outputs of the
three neural networks with the sigmoid activation function
are called i, f , and o, respectively, and the output of the
neural network with the tanh activation function is called g.
The outputs of these neural networks enter the gateways and
generate the output of the entire LSTM cell and the new cell
state that goes to the next LSTM cell.
The function that is applied by the gates to the outputs of the
neural networks can be described as follows. Since f , i, and o
are outputs of the sigmoid activation function, they have values
between zero and one. This makes these outputs suitable for
acting as gateways. If we look at the status of a cell in the form
of a variable, the f gate can restore the cell state to its original
value (i.e., set its value to 0). The goal of the gateway i is to
determine if it is going to increase or decrease the cell state,
and gate g specifies the amount of change in cell state. As
described above, gate g is the output of the tanh activation
function so that it can be between −1 and 1. Therefore, if
i manages to make a change in cell state, the value of this
change is determined by the gate g. The o gate also specifies
whether the cell’s state should be transferred as the exit of this
layer to the output or not. Consequently, LSTM learns when
it is necessary to forget a piece of information and when it is
necessary to process and memorize them.
3) LSTM-Based Classifier: Since in practice, it has been
observed that LSTM based classifiers and their variants per-
form very well on sequential data, we construct a deep learning
model with two LSTM layers as a proof of concept for our
proposed deep intrusion detection (DID) framework. Figure 5
presents the details of the proposed model. As shown in Fig-
ure 5, after extraction of sequential features with LSTM layers
(with 100 and 50 units, respectively), some fully connected
layers (with 2500, 1250, 512, 256, 64, and 16 neurons) are
employed to extract the more complicated features. Finally,
a softmax layer is applied for binary classification between
attack and benign traffics. The activation functions of all layers
(except the last one) are ReLU, and in order to avoid over-
fitting, some dropout layers with a 20% drop rate are added
among fully connected ones. Finally, the Adam algorithm is
used for optimization in the training phase, and the loss value
is computed by binary cross-entropy as the loss function.
LSTM LayersReached Normalized Matrix Fully Connected Layers Labeled Flow
50 units
100 units
100 * 200 
Flow Matrix
2500 
neurons
1250 
neurons
512 
neurons
256 
neurons
64  
neurons
16   
neurons
Benign
Attack
Flatten Layer
Fig. 5. The proposed LSTM-based classifier used in the our DID framework.
TABLE I
DETAILS OF THE ISCX IDS 2017 DATASET.
Day Attack type Attack Size Benign Size
Monday - 0B 11GB
Tuesday Brute Force 51MB 11GB
Wednesday DoS / DDoS 2GB 11GB
Thursday Web Attack, Infiltration 42MB 8.4GB
Friday Botnet ARES, Port Scan 2GB 7.5 GB
IV. EXPERIMENT
This section contains a real implementation of a DID
instance on the ISCX IDS 2017 dataset. In the following, first,
the ISCX IDS 2017 dataset is briefly introduced. Then, after
the explanation of the pre-processing phase, the experimental
results are presented and compared with McPAD [8] as a well-
known content-based detection approach.
A. Dataset
For this research, ISCX IDS 2017 is used as the benchmark
dataset. This dataset is made of 30GB network traffic captured
in seven different days, which is the most recent IDS evalua-
tion dataset and contains different types of attacks. Especially,
content-based attacks like Heartbleed are also included in this
dataset. Traffic capturing is done in a simulated computer
network with several servers and clients. The developers of
ISCX IDS 2017 have analyzed real traces of a client-server
network and have tried to create the same profile for the
clients. The details of the seven days of network traffic are
shown in Table I.
The main advantages of this dataset compared to the previ-
ous ones are:
• Implementing a complete network configuration, includ-
ing Modem, Firewall, Switches, Routers, and a variety of
operating systems.
• Simulation of user profiles.
• The dataset is labeled. This is a requirement for classi-
fication purposes. Besides, it presents the full captured
traffic without anonymization techniques.
• Implementing all kind of interactions in the network.
• Using a wide range of protocols and network attacks.
Although, as explained above, this dataset has many advan-
tages, it has its shortcomings too. One of the most important
7deficiencies of this dataset is its limited variety of protocols
and attacks in comparison to real-world traffics. For example,
IP addresses of attack traffic are very limited, and hence, the
other IP addresses can be recognized as pure benign traffic.
More precisely, attacks on Tuesday and Wednesday are just
focused on one and two destination addresses, respectively.
Besides, DoS attacks on Friday are all from a specific client
IP address. On the other hand, real network conditions like
packet loss and different TTLs are not presented in this
dataset. Moreover, so many kinds of applications like social
networking, are not considered.
Finally, according to our survey, the ISCX IDS 2017 dataset
is one of the best dataset available in the context of IDS.
However, we should be aware of its weaknesses and simplicity.
Obviously, in the real world, we need to implement more
complicated models with increments in the number of layers
and the number of nodes in each layer. Moreover, as discussed
in Section III-A, we should be aware of this lack of diversity
in the pre-processing phase.
B. Pre-processing
In this phase, we prepare the dataset as the input of a
neural network. First, we need to extract and split the network
flows from the pcap files. To this end, we read the large pcap
files and make separate files per each flow. Flow separation is
based on the source port, destination port, source IP address,
destination IP address, and flow start time. The end of flow is
reached when the TCP FIN packet is read, or the maximum
flow time (1,200,000 ms) is passed.
1) Constructing the Input Matrix: Network flows are not
suitable to be input directly to the neural network. To make the
flows applicable, we have to apply several changes to them.
First, we read the packets of each flow. For each packet,
the data link header is removed since it does not have any
information for network intrusion detection tasks. Then we
read the bytes of the packet and divide them by 255 to obtain
a normalized value between 0 and 1.
The maximum size of each packet is 1514 bytes, and smaller
packets are padded by zero-value bytes. Besides, since the
header length of UDP is less than TCP, we add zero to the
end of the UDP header so it will have the same size as TCP
header. There are some fields in network traffic, which can
mislead the deep learning model. For example, the checksum
field can have random values, and most probably, it is useless.
Moreover, as explained above, IP addresses can lead to the
overfitting problem. We mask the value of these fields by zero.
In the end, we will have an n × 1514 matrix, where n is the
number of packets.
The dimensions of the input matrix for this dataset can
be reduced by inspecting the dataset traffic. As shown in
Figure 6, packet size in normal and attack traffic has two
distinct ranges: packets that have only the first 200 bytes, and
packets with the maximum size of 1514 bytes. By performing
several experiments on the dataset, we found that the first 200
bytes of each packet constitutes the discriminant bytes, and
inspecting extra bytes has no significant impact on the learning
accuracy. In addition, benign and attack flows in this dataset
contain mainly less than 100 packets (as shown in Figure 7).
So, inspecting only the first 100 packets of each flow can
yield almost a complete evaluation of the nature of flows in
the ISCX 2017 dataset.
Finally, we have chosen the first 200 bytes of the first 100
packets of each flow as an input matrix according to the nature
of flows in this dataset.
(a) Benign
(b) Attack
Fig. 6. Distribution of the number of bytes per packet in benign (6a) and
attack (6b) traffic.
2) Subsampling: As shown in Table I, the size of the ISCX
IDS 2017 dataset is 50GB before the pre-processing phase,
and the pre-processing phase increases its size tremendously
to more than 500GB. Due to hardware limitations, we cannot
use all of the network flows for training the neural network.
Therefore, we need to reduce the size of the dataset. Also, the
dataset is imbalanced, and the number of normal flows is much
higher than the number of attack flows. This does not allow
to train correctly and sufficiently the neural network. To fix
these issues, we choose all of the attack flows and select the
same amount of normal flows randomly, which will balance
the dataset and reduce the size of the input data. Finally, we
have a pre-processed dataset with a size of around 40GB.
8(a) Benign
(b) Attack
Fig. 7. Distribution of the number of packets per flow in benign (7a) and
attack (7b) traffics.
C. Experimental Results
After converting each flow to an enriched input matrix, we
have split the dataset randomly into three subsets. The first
set, which contains 64% of the flows, is used for training and
tuning the weights of the deep learning model. The second
and third sets are used during validation and test phases and
contain 16% and 20% of flows, respectively.
There exist several metrics for evaluating the performance
of the trained model. Among them, we have chosen precision
(PR), recall (RC), fall-out (FO), and F1 score (F1). Based on a
confusion matrix, equations of these parameters are stated as
follows (TP: true positive, FP: false positive, TN: true negative,
and FN: false negative):
PR = TP/(TP + FP), (1)
RC = TP/(TP + FN), (2)
FO = FP/(FP + TN), (3)
F1 =
2 × PR × RC
PR + RC
. (4)
TABLE II
THE HARDWARE EXPERIMENT ENVIRONMENT.
OS Debian version 9.3 with kernel 4.9.0-amd64
CPU Intel(R) Xeon(R) X5680 3.33GHz with 24
virtual cores
RAM 18 GB
GPU GeForce GTX 1080 Ti
GPU Frame Buffer 11 GB
Recall (RC) is a valuable metric in IDSs as it determines the
ratio of attacks that have been detected to the actual attacks.
Besides, the ratio of benign flows, which are labeled as attacks,
to the total actual benign flows is determined by the fall-out
(FO). Precision (PR) shows the ratio of correctly generated
alerts (existence of attacks) to all alerts. This metric represents
the trust of network administrators to the generated security
alarms. Finally, F1 score tries to make a balance between
the importance of precision and recall. This is achieved by
calculating the harmonic mean of these valuable metrics.
To implement our deep learning model, we have used the
Keras library [37], with Tensorflow [38] as its backend. The
characteristic of our experiment environment is shown in
Table II.
Figure 8 depicts the value of loss in the training phase.
Finally, at the end of the training phase, the mean of loss in
training and validation data is 0.03 and 0.01, respectively. The
lower value of loss in the validation phase is due to the dropout
layers applied during the training phase, which improves the
generalization of the deep model. Consequently, by removing
them in the validation phase, better results have been achieved.
The results of the evaluation of this model by the test data are
presented in Table III.
Fig. 8. Loss of the proposed deep learning module of DID during the training
phase.
Our work is comparable with [34] and [8]. Soheily-Khah et
al. [34] use 50 features of the ISCX 2012 dataset for evaluation
of their model, which is achieved by combining K-means and
random forest algorithms. This research is related to our work
since it uses some learning algorithms over the ISCX dataset,
and this method can be compared with deep learning. Their
model has achieved recall and fall-out of around 98.9 and
0.1, respectively. Note that since they have not announced the
average evaluation metrics, we have used their reported tables
9TABLE III
THE RESULTS ACHIEVED BY THE PROPOSED DID FRAMEWORK AND ITS
COMPARISON TO MCPAD, BOTH EVALUATED ON THE ISCX IDS 2017.
BESIDES, THE REPORTED VALUES OF [34] OVER ISCX IDS 2012 ARE
PRESENTED.
Dataset Model Precision Fall-out Recall F1 score
ISCX IDS
2017
DID
(with LSTM) 0.992 0.002 0.998 0.992
McPAD [8] 0.993 0.019 0.177 0.300
ISCX IDS
2012
Soheily-Khah
and et al. [34] 0.987 0.001 0.989 0.988
and the mean of metrics for different protocols (since PR was
not reported, the value is calculated).
The other related work is [8], which is one of the best
researches about detecting content-based attacks. We have
evaluated this method by using its source code, which is
available at [39]. Even though this code yields suitable results
over the dataset used by themselves in [8], but it shows a
weak performance in learning ISCX IDS 2017 dataset. This
weakness is related to the comprehensiveness of the ISCX
IDS dataset against previous ones like DARPA or KDD99.
The results of the evaluation of McPAD by ISCX IDS 2017
are represented in Table III.
The main weakness of McPAD is its detection rate, repre-
sented by the recall, which is around 20%. Although McPAD
has a significant detection rate over the dataset used in [8], it
cannot be beneficial in real-world traffic. Further inspections
show that while their normal traffic is suitable, but the attack
ones which are used in the evaluation, has some notable
weaknesses. For example, allShellcode.pcap file has only 11
TCP sessions, which in each one contains a shell-code attack.
As the NOP sled in these attacks has many repetitions of bytes
like 0x90 and 0x61, they can be easily detected. Besides, in
the other attack file, which is called allGeneric.pcap, has 66
HTTP attacks. Among them, there are 11 shell-code attacks
that can be detected as the previous one, and the others have
hostnames that do not exist in the training dataset (like www
and www.i-pi.com). Consequently, the n-gram mechanism can
detect these kinds of attacks. However, in the case of the ISCX
IDS 2017 dataset, although its alarm has significant reliability
(PR = 99.3%), its detection rate is low (RC = 17.7%).
Finally, we would like to mention that the average delay of
our proposed model per flow in the test phase is around 100
milliseconds. Since the input data in DID are flows, according
to [40], on average, we can assume each flow contains 78
packets, and each packet contains 870 bytes. As a result, the
proposed model with our test environment can handle around
5 Megabit per second, which can be a challenge in high-
performance applications that should be addressed in future
works.
D. Discussion
According to our experiments, the proposed deep intrusion
detection (DID) approach can have a comparative advantage
over previous works in inspecting more varieties of attacks,
especially the ones that are placed in the payload of traffic.
However, the proposed approach has some challenges which
should be addressed in future works. Some of these challenges
are explained below.
The main current shortcoming of using deep learning in
network detection is its throughput. With the increasing rate
of internet bandwidth, we have to count on devices with
appropriate throughput along with a high detection rate and
low false alarm. Consequently, according to the complexity
of deep learning algorithms, one of the main forward steps
toward this goal is to optimize the deep intrusion detectors and
implement them over high-performance devices like FPGAs or
ASICs.
Another challenge to making ML-based IDSes more ap-
plicable in practice is to adapt them to imbalanced data.
The imbalance of data can make a machine learning model
tend to the major category. However, detecting the minor
category may be of high value for us (such as detecting
cancer in medical applications or attack detection in computer
networks). Alongside, if the test dataset is also imbalanced,
the overall detection rate of the algorithm cannot provide an
effective measure of the performance of the intrusion detection
method in real scenarios. For example, for a dataset with 95%
benign traffic, this can lead to a model that labels all the inputs
as benign traffic to achieve 95% accuracy while the desired
goal of the intrusion detection system is to detect attacks as
much as possible with low false positive. In this paper, the data
reduction mechanism for the majority group has been applied.
However, this solution can cause some losses in the diversity
of the major category (i.e., in this paper, the benign traffic).
Consequently, some kinds of benign flows may be detected
as attacks in a more comprehensive dataset, which has more
complicated attacks.
Finally, in this research, we have used a labeled dataset for
training the model. However, the lack of adequate diversity in
this dataset can lead to poor performance in real networks. On
the other hand, each network has its own behavior for normal
traffics (like the number of new connections per second),
which may be considered an abnormal behavior in other
networks. Hence, it is very crucial that we learn the models
according to their deployment environment.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a Deep Intrusion Detection
approach that uses deep learning algorithms for detecting a
wide range of attacks, including content-based ones like SQL
injection and Heartbleed attack. We have used an LSTM-based
model as an implementation of the deep learning module of the
DID approach. LSTM layers can extract meaningful relations
among bytes of packets of each flow. Besides using dropout
layers, we tried to avoid overfitting. Four metrics that provide
valuable information in intrusion detection applications have
been selected for evaluation, namely, precision, recall, fall-
out, and F1 score. On the ISCX IDS 2017 dataset, we have
achieved a precision of 0.992, fall-out of 0.2, recall of 0.998,
and F1 score of 0.992. The experimental results show that the
proposed approach has better performance in comparison with
the previous work.
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